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The citizen suit provisions of federal envi-
ronmental laws authorize private individuals
and organizations to bring actions against
alleged violators. However, these citizen suit
provisions, particularly under the Clean Water
Act,1 often pose a myriad of procedural hurdles
that must be overcome to even reach the mer-
its.2 In addition to these technical legal
requirements, such lawsuits are expensive,
time-consuming and difficult to manage. Yet
these significant, but peripheral, obstacles are
moot if the litigants lack standing to bring suit
in federal court.
Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits
the federal courts to hearing "cases" and "con-
troversies."3 This necessarily restricts the fed-
eral courts to litigants with actual grievances
based on "legally cognizable injur[ies]".4 This
standing requirement contains three ele-
ments.5 First, the plaintiff must have suffered
an actual or imminent personal injury.6
Second, the injury must be "fairly traceable to
the challenged action of the defendant."7
Third, a favorable decision by the court must
likely redress the injury.8
These standing rules apply to individuals
as well as organizations maintaining causes of
action on their own behalf. However, when an
organization sues on behalf of its members, it
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3.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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must meet the further requirements of "associ-
ational" or "organizational" standing.9 To have
standing, the organization must first establish
its members would have individual standing to
sue.10 The organization must then demonstrate
"the interests it seeks to protect are germane to
the organization's purpose" and neither the
claim nor relief requires the members to par-
ticipate in the suit.11
Although standing is constitutionally
required for cases brought in federal court, all
hope is not lost for the organization or individ-
ual lacking standing. A plaintiff can avoid the
standing issue altogether by bringing the
cause of action, either on one's own behalf or
on behalf of the public, under California's
Unfair Competition Law12 in state court. The
Unfair Competition Law provides a separate
cause of action predicated upon violations of
other laws or unfair or fraudulent business
practices.13
This note will examine the use of
California's Unfair Competition Law14 to avoid
the constitutional standing issue under the
Clean Water Act15 and obtain injunctions, resti-
tution and attorneys' fees in the process. In
doing so, this note provides background infor-
mation on the Clean Water Act citizen suit pro-
vision and the basic requirements for suing
under California's Unfair Competition Law.
Finally, it will identify the drawbacks and
potential pitfalls of this litigation route, and
recommend solutions for overcoming these
problems.
II. Background
A. Clean Water Act
Congress originally enacted the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act in 1948.16 The orig-
inal statute provided a state structure for pre-
venting and abating water pollution, with the
federal role "limited to support of, and assis-
tance to, the States."17 It was not until 1972
that Congress meaningfully overhauled the law
and enacted the measures commonly known
today as the Clean Water Act.18
The Clean Water Act ("CWA") sets two
national goals — the attainment of fishable
and swimmable waters and the elimination of
pollutant discharges into navigable waters.19
To meet these objectives, the CWA prohibits
point source discharges except as authorized
by permit.20 The permit system allows for the
discharge of any pollutant upon the condition
that such discharge will meet effluent limita-
tions as established by the CWA.21 Thus, failure
to comply with permit conditions is a violation
of the CWA.22
The Act also establishes pretreatment
requirements for discharges to publicly owned
treatment works23 and permit requirements for
dredge and fill operations in navigable
waters,24 including wetlands.25
The CWA provides for enforcement of its
provisions through self-monitoring and report-
ing by permittees, supported by inspections by
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").26
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9.  MASSEY, supra note 4.
10.  Hunt v. Wa. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
343 (1977).
11.  Id.
12.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200-17208 (West 1997).
13.  Id.
14.  Id.
15.  Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a) (1994).




19.  Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 101(a).
20. Id. §§ 301(a), 501(12).  A point source is "any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance," including a pipe, ditch, con-
tainer or vessel. Id. § 501(13).  A point source does not refer to
agricultural run-off.  Id.
21.  Id. § 402(a)(1).  Effluent limitations are standards set by
the EPA or the state for the quantity or concentration of a pollu-
tant.  Id. § 502(11).  Effluent limitations are nationally standard-
ized by industry, not by pollutant, facility or condition of water-
way.
22.  Id. § 301(a).
23.  Id. § 307.
24. Id. § 404; see also Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, -- U.S. --, 121 S.
Ct. 675, 680 (2001) (holding "navigable waters" does not extend to
isolated wetlands).
25.  Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 121 S. Ct. at
680; United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
131 (1985).
26.  Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 308(a)-(b).
tions through administrative compliance
orders, civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day
and enforcement actions for injunctive relief.27
The Act also provides for civil enforcement
by the federal government and citizens.28
Section 505(a) authorizes 
any citizen [to] commence a civil
action on his own behalf . . . against
any person . . . who is alleged to be in
violation of [] an effluent standard or
limitation under this [Act] or [] an
order issued by the Administrator or a
State with respect to such a standard
or limitation.29
The provision gives federal courts jurisdic-
tion over such suits, regardless of diversity or
amount in controversy.30 Citizens must provide
notice to the EPA and the violator 60 days prior
to bringing suit.31 A pending government
action requiring compliance bars a citizen suit
on the same matter.32
The CWA permits citizen suits to be
brought against parties alleged to be "in viola-
tion of" the Act.33 The United States Supreme
Court, in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, determined that this language
prevented the Chesapeake Bay Foundation
from bringing suit against the company for
wholly past permit violations.34 Since the
statute's citizen suit provision itself only
authorizes suit against a defendant "alleged to
be in violation of" the Act, the Court concluded
"statutory standing" to bring suit was estab-
lished only by good faith allegations of current
or ongoing violations.35 Accordingly, suits
based on wholly past violations lack jurisdic-
tion under section 505 of the Clean Water Act.36
In addition to the statutory standing barri-
er against citizen suits based on wholly past
CWA violations, constitutional standing
requirements prohibit such suits as well. In
Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment,37
the Supreme Court dismissed a citizen suit for
lack of standing because only wholly past vio-
lations were alleged. The organization sued the
defendant company for failure to make
required reporting under the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act
of 1986.38 The Court found that a case based on
wholly past violations fails the third test of
standing — redressability.39 A court cannot
grant injunctive relief once the injurious con-
duct has ended.40 Civil penalties paid to the
federal government do not redress a private lit-
igant's injury, and thus cannot support stand-
ing.41 Likewise, recovery of litigation costs
alone cannot support standing.42 Thus, the
organization's claim failed because the Court
was unable to provide relief to remedy the
injury allegedly suffered under the statute.
Consequently, citizen suits under the CWA
face three significant obstacles. First, diligent
government prosecution of violators bars citi-
zen suits seeking compliance with the CWA.43
Second, statutory language prevents citizen
suits under the CWA for wholly past viola-
tions.44 Third, constitutional standing require-
ments further limit CWA citizen suits based on
past permit infractions.45 Nonetheless, plain-
tiffs may surmount these impediments by
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27. Id. § 309(a),(b),(d).  Citizens bringing suit under the CWA
may also receive litigation costs. Id. § 505(d).
28. Id. § 505.
29. Id. § 505(a).
30. Id.
31.  Id. § 505(b).
32. Id.
33.  Id. § 505(a).
34.  484 U.S. 49, 64 (1987).
35. Id. at 64-65.  This requirement is necessary only to sur-
vive summary judgment. To prevail at trial, plaintiff must prove
actual CWA violations. Id.
36. Id. at 64.
37.  523 U.S. 83 (1998).
38.  42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1997).
39.  Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 109-10.
40.  Id.
41.  Id.
42. Id. at 107-08.
43.  Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505(b), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b) (1994).
44. Id. § 505(g); Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64.
45.  Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 109-10.
B. California's Unfair Competition Law
California's Unfair Competition Law46
("UCL") prohibits "any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice and unfair,
deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising."47
Anyone "who engages, has engaged, or propos-
es to engage" in such activity falls under the
Act and is subject to its penalties.48
The primary purpose of the UCL is to
extend to the public a cause of action normal-
ly held only by direct business competitors.49
The UCL is a legislative recognition that unfair
competition causes harm in situations that
reach beyond normal business competition.50
Thus, the government or "any person acting for
the interests of itself, its members or the gen-
eral public"51 may bring an action under the
statute. This language provides standing for
anyone "to sue to enjoin an unfair practice,
regardless of whether the person or organiza-
tion has suffered injury as a result of the prac-
tice."52 Such an action brought on behalf of the
public is referred to as a representative action53
or a private attorney general suit.54
A violation of the UCL requires but a single
practice or act55 that satisfies one of the prongs
of the statute — unfair, unlawful or fraudu-
lent.56  While violations under the UCL general-
ly focus on traditional consumer protection
concerns, the statute is "not confined to anti-
competitive business practices, but is also
directed toward the public's right to protection
from fraud, deceit[] and unlawful conduct."57
To violate the unlawful prong, the UCL
"borrows violations of other laws and treats
them as unlawful practices" that are independ-
ently actionable under the statute.58 The UCL
does not require the underlying law to provide
for civil enforcement.59 The UCL serves as the
enforcement mechanism for "anything that can
properly be called a business practice and that
at the same time is forbidden by law."60
Virtually any law can serve as the predicate
statute under the UCL.61 This includes not only
state laws, but also federal statutes,62 local













Shaye Diveley-Coyne Volume 7, Number 2
46.  The legislature did not provide a name for Business and
Professions Code sections 17200 through 17208, so this note will
use the label "Unfair Competition Law" to refer to the statute.
Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086,
1089 n.2 (Cal. 1998).
47.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997).
48.  Id. § 17203.
49. See Marc S. Virga, Unfair Competition, in 6 BUSINESS
LITIGATION § 60.5 (1993).
50.  See People ex rel. Mosk v. Nat'l Research Co. of Cal., 201
Cal. App. 2d 765, 770 (1962); see also WILLIAM L. STERN, UNFAIR
BUSINESS PRACTICES AND FALSE ADVERTISING BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200
29-28 (1999).
51.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204.
52.  James R. McCall et al., Greater Representation for California
Consumers -- Fluid Recovery, Consumer Trust Funds, and Representative
Actions, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 797, 814-15 (1995).  Representative
actions generally refer to suits brought on behalf of absent par-
ties, but not certified as a class action.
53.  Id. at 812-13.
54.  Julie B. Strickland & Andrew Moritz, Defending Against
Claims Brought Under California Business and Professions Code Section
17200 Et Seq., 990A PLI/Corp 727, 737-38 (1997).
55.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200.  However, this was not
always the case.  Before the legislature amended section 17200 to
include "practice or act," the California Supreme Court interpret-
ed UCL as prohibiting only unfair, unlawful or fraudulent practices.
California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc., 762 P.2d 385, 399
(Cal. 1988).  "Practices," according to the court, necessarily
implied more than one act -- it required a pattern or course of
conduct. Id.
56.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200.  The UCL essentially cre-
ates three categories of unfair competition. Cel-Tech
Communications, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 540
(Cal. 1999).  In the context of this note, only the first two cate-
gories - unlawful or unfair - will be discussed and applied to
Clean Water Act breaches.  Nevertheless, it is important to note
that the fraudulent acts prohibited by the UCL bear little resem-
blance to the common law torts of deceit or fraud. See generally
STERN, supra note 50, at 60.  Instead, a court will analyze a busi-
ness act or practice under the fraud prong by determining
whether there is a likelihood that members of the public may be
deceived.  See Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545,
553 (Cal. 1992) (citing Chern v. Bank of Am., 544 P.2d 1310 (Cal.
1976)).
57.  Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 54 Cal. App. 4th 499,
518 (1997); see also Comm. on Children's Television, Inc., v. Gen.
Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 667 (Cal. 1983).
58. Cel-Tech Communications, Inc., 973 P.2d at 539-40.
59.  Id. at 541.
60.  Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 826 P.2d 730, 734
(Cal. 1992).
61.  See Klein v. Earth Elements, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 4th 965,
969 (1997).  See also STERN, supra note 50, at 37-46, for a discussion
of the range of laws, regulations, ordinances, court-made direc-
tives and professional standards that can serve as the predicate
statutes under the UCL..
62.  See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env't v. Union Oil, 996 F.
Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (Clean Water Act); Southwest Marine,
Inc. v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(RICO).
63.  Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 54 Cal. App. 4th 499
(1997).
The underlying laws may be criminal or civil.64
The UCL "borrows" any law and imposes strict
liability for violations of it.65 Intent is not an
element of the UCL violation.66 Thus, lack of
intent to injure anyone or engage in unlawful
conduct is not a defense.67
Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp. illustrates
the broad compass of the UCL. In Hewlett, a pri-
vate individual, the Sierra Club and the county
district attorney brought an action under the
UCL against Squaw Valley for harvesting tim-
ber on its property.68 The company had been in
dispute with various organizations over its
plans to expand its ski runs.69 "When litigation
threatened the planned project, Squaw Valley
in essence resorted to self-help and cut more
than 1,800 trees."70 The company claimed it
believed its conduct was lawful.71 However, a
California appellate court ruled that Squaw
Valley, intentionally or not, violated state
forestry laws, a local conditional use permit
and a temporary restraining order72.  These vio-
lations served as the predicate unlawful busi-
ness practices under the UCL.73 Unintentional
violations of underlying laws could not serve as
Squaw Valley's defense to the UCL allega-
tions.74
Furthermore, because "[u]nless otherwise
expressly provided, the remedies or penalties
provided by [the UCL] are cumulative to each
other and to the remedies or penalties avail-
able under all other laws,"75 preemption or
implied repeal are not usually factors in bring-
ing suit. Preemption occurs when a federal pro-
vision is intended, either explicitly or implicit-
ly, to be the exclusive governing authority on
the matter, or conflicts with state regulation.76
Although it is still a common defense to UCL
claims based on violations of federal law,77 the
courts have generally limited federal preemp-
tion of UCL suits to cases involving compre-
hensive federal schemes that supersede all
state regulation in the field, such as the feder-
al Copyright Act78 or ERISA.79 Likewise, many
courts have refused to find an implied repeal of
the UCL cause of action by other state laws.
"[T]he implied repeal doctrine applies '[w]hen
two or more statutes [enacted by the same leg-
islature] concern the same subject matter and
are in irreconcilable conflict.’”80 Usually the
most recent enactment is considered the will
of the legislature and, thus, prevails over prior
inconsistent measures.81 However, due to the
explicit language of the UCL, claims under the
statute generally prevail against implied repeal
arguments and relief is permitted, unless the
underlying state law expressly provides other-
wise.82
Just because an act may not be unlawful
does not prevent a plaintiff from seeking
redress under the UCL. Since the UCL's prohi-
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64.  See, e.g., Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,
950 P.2d 1086 (Cal. 1998) (criminal prohibition against selling
tobacco to minors).
65.  Hewlett, 54 Cal. App. 4th at 520.
66. Id.
67.  Id.
68.  Id. at 499.
69.  Id. at 509.
70. Id.
71.  Id. at 520.
72.  Id. at 499.
73.  Id.
74.  Id. at 520.
75.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17205 (West 1997).
76. See Smiley v. Citibank, 900 P.2d 690, 696 (Cal. 1995)
(finding the National Bank Act preempts UCL suit).
77.  STERN, supra note 50, at 138.
78.  See Symantec Corp. v. McAfee Assoc., Inc., 1998 WL
740798 at 5 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 1998) (finding UCL claim alleging
only the reproduction and distribution of protected material in
violation of federal Copyright Act is preempted by Act's provision
exclusively governing such conduct).
79.  See Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F. Supp.
388, 392 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (finding UCL claim preempted by ERISA
where such claim may conflict with the controls for the plan set
by federal law).
80.  Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d
1086, 1096 (Cal. 1998).  
81.  See id.
82.  See id. at 1099.  Here, the California Supreme Court
refused to find the Stop Tobacco Access to Kids Enforcement Act
and related penal provisions implicitly repealed the private right
of action under the UCL.  Id. The only way to achieve such a
result, according to the Court, was to "read the word 'implicitly'
into section 17205 or read the word 'expressly' out of it" - an inter-
pretation beyond the authority of the Court.  Id. 
83.  The UCL prohibits "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice." CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West
1997) (emphasis added).
ness practice not specifically prohibited by law
may still be unfair, thus violating the UCL.84
This broad scope of the UCL
permit[s] tribunals to enjoin on-going
wrongful business conduct in whatever
context such activity might occur.
Indeed, . . . the section was intention-
ally framed in its broad, sweeping lan-
guage, precisely to enable judicial tri-
bunals to deal with the innumerable
"new schemes which the fertility of
man's invention would contrive."85
The type of conduct prohibited under the
unfairness prong of the UCL depends on the
parties potentially injured by the conduct.86
Prior to the California Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Cel-Tech Communications, Inc., v. Los Angeles
Cellular Telephone Co., the appellate courts uti-
lized many interpretations of the unfairness
prong.87 Lower court definitions of unfairness
included practices that "offend an established
public policy"88 or result in harm to the victim
that outweighs the utility of the conduct.89 The
California Supreme Court determined such
definitions lacked guidance and consistent
interpretation.90
As a result, the California Supreme Court
determined an unfair act or practice is "con-
duct that threatens an incipient violation of an
antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of
one of those laws because its effects are com-
parable to or the same as a violation of the law,
or otherwise significantly threatens or harms
competition."91 This holding is based largely
on section five of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.92 This foundation, along with
other language in Cel-Tech, indicates that the
court's holding may be limited to direct com-
petitors.93 Consequently, what constitutes
unfairness in other scenarios — such as in con-
sumer actions — is still uncertain.
Whether under the unlawful or unfairness
prong, "[t]he UCL cannot be used to state a
cause of action the gist of which is absolutely
barred under some other principle of law."94 If
the legislature has examined certain conduct
and expressly made it lawful or "concluded no
action should lie, courts may not override that
determination."95 However, this rule does not
apply if another statute simply fails to prohibit
such conduct or provide for a cause of action.96
Yet, even with this limitation, the reach of the
UCL is extremely broad.
III. Bringing Suit Under the Unfair 
Competition Law Premised on the 
Clean Water Act
A violation of the CWA is actionable under
the UCL.97 Although most UCL violations are
predicated on state laws, this "does not pre-
clude the use of a violation of federal law as
grounds for [UCL] liability."98
To plead a cause of action under the UCL's
unlawful prong, the "plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to show a violation of some underly-
ing law."99 Thus, to state a claim under the UCL
predicated on the CWA, a plaintiff need only
provide sufficient facts to demonstrate a viola-
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84.  See Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel.
Co., 973 P.2d 527, 540 (Cal. 1999).
85. Id. (quoting Am. Philatelic Soc'y v. Claibourne, 46 P.2d
135, 140 (Cal. 1935)).
86.  Id. at 554 n.12.
87. Id. at 543.
88.  People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc., 159
Cal. App. 3d 509, 530 (1984).
89.  State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.
App. 4th 1093, 1104 (1996).
90.  Cel-Tech Communications, Inc., 973 P.2d at 543.
91. Id. at 554. 
92.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1997).
93. Cel-Tech Communications, Inc., 973 P.2d at 554 n.12 (noting
"[n]othing we say relates to actions by consumers or by competi-
tors alleging other kinds of violations of the unfair competition
law such as 'fraudulent' or 'unlawful' business practices").
94.  Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d
1086, 1094 (Cal. 1998).
95. Cel-Tech Communications, Inc., 973 P.2d at 541.
96.  Id.
97.  Citizens for a Better Env't v. Union Oil, 996 F. Supp. 934,
938 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
98.  Id.
99.  Strickland & Moritz, supra note 54, at 741.
100.  Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a) (1994).
dredge or fill101 or a failure to meet pretreat-
ment qualifications set by the Act.102
If a plaintiff is unable to allege a point-
source violation of the CWA, it may be possible
to seek relief under the unfairness prong of the
UCL. This is a more difficult route because it is
still unclear how the courts define "unfair" in
actions not involving direct competitors.103
Although no reported cases have considered
the issue, using the unfairness prong might
provide a way to bring suit to stop nonpoint
sources104 of pollutants. The CWA does not
specifically prohibit nonpoint sources of con-
taminants and includes no enforcement mech-
anism addressing such discharges.105 Yet, the
discharge of pollutants through nonpoint
sources violates the CWA's national goal of
eliminating all pollutant discharges into navi-
gable waters.106
When reviewing a claim under the unfair-
ness prong of the UCL, a court will first look to
see if any laws provide a "safe harbor" for the
alleged unfair conduct.107 Such a statute must
expressly permit the conduct, not just fail to
prohibit it.108 In the case of a nonpoint source
polluter, the CWA does not permit the conduct;
it simply provides no prohibition or enforce-
ment against it.109 Thus, a UCL suit based on
nonpoint source discharges likely meets the
first step.
Next, the court applies the Cel-Tech test for
unfairness, considering whether the conduct
"violates the policy or spirit" of an antitrust law
"or otherwise significantly threatens or harms
competition."110 This language would appear to
limit the UCL's unfairness prong to anticom-
petitive business practices. However, the test
was designed for cases involving direct com-
petitors,111 rather than consumers or other
injured parties. If courts were to artificially
limit the scope of the unfairness prong to the
narrow realm of traditionally anticompetitive
conduct, it would be inconsistent with judicial
and legislative recognition that other business
acts create unfair competition and threaten to
deceive the public as well.112
In fact, the Cel-Tech court reiterated the
need for the unfairness prong of the UCL to
address wrongful business acts "in whatever
context such activity might occur," including
such acts that fall outside the explicit reach of
applicable laws.113 Accordingly, the proper
interpretation of the Cel-Tech test would be to
find a business act that "violates the policy or
spirit" of other laws is a proper basis for the
unfairness prong. Under such a standard, a
court could determine that a nonpoint source
discharge violates the national policy of the
CWA and, thus, is an unfair act under the UCL.
IV. Benefits of Using the Unfair 
Competition Law
A. UCL Relaxes Standing Requirements
The relaxed standing requirement is the
obvious benefit of bringing a state cause of
action under the UCL instead of a federal claim
based solely on the CWA citizen suit provision.
The UCL provides standing to any person,
regardless of injury, to bring suit as a private
attorney general on behalf of the public. 114 This
enables an organization or individual, lacking
standing to bring a CWA action in federal court,
to bring the same action in state court. 
B. UCL May Allow for Actions Based on 
Wholly Past Violations
Under the UCL, plaintiffs possibly can
bring claims premised on wholly past viola-
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101.  Id. § 404.
102.  Id. § 307.
103.  Supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
104.  Although not defined by CWA, nonpoint sources gen-
erally refer to discharges that do not fall under the definition of
point source in § 501(13) of the Act. These includes urban run-off
and agricultural discharges.  
105.  Id. § 309.
106.  Id. § 101(a).
107.  Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co.,
973 P.2d 527, 544 (Cal. 1999).
108.  Id. at 542.
109.  Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 301(a), 309.
110.  Cel-Tech Communications, Inc., 973 P.2d at 540.
111.  Id. at 554 n.12.
112.  Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 54 Cal. App. 4th 499,
518 (1997); People ex rel. Mosk v. Nat'l Research Co. of Cal., 201
Cal. App. 2d 765, 770 (1962).
113.  Cel-Tech Communications, Inc., 973 P.2d at 540.
114.  McCall, supra note 52 at 812-15.
mechanism for bringing suit, plaintiffs do not
have to rely on the citizen suit provision of the
CWA to support a cause of action.115
Consequently, plaintiffs are not limited by the
statutory language allowing suits only against
parties "in violation of" the Act.116
Litigants seeking this route should be
aware that the outcome is uncertain. Previous
case law indicates the UCL "is unavailable to
remedy past misconduct."117 However, this
assertion may be based on prior construction
of the UCL, which limited claims to "business
practices" rather than a single business act.118
The courts interpreted "practices" to "require,
at a minimum, ongoing conduct," thus pre-
cluding claims for past violations.119 Since the
UCL has been amended to prohibit a single act
of unfair competition,120 the bar on claims
based past violations is likely no longer appli-
cable. Thus, UCL claims based on past CWA
violations are possible, as long as litigants
request some relief that the court can grant.121
C. State Actions May Not Bar UCL 
Claims
UCL remedies "are cumulative to each
other and to the remedies or penalties avail-
able under all other laws."122 Thus, even if other
entities are pursuing penalties for the same
unfair competition, UCL remedies still apply.123
This differs from the citizen suit provision of
the CWA, which bars citizen suits when the
federal government is already prosecuting to
secure compliance with the permit.124
D. Limited Participants Means 
Decreased Costs
Seeking relief via a private attorney general
suit under the UCL rather than a claim under
the CWA is less costly for organizations.125
Since establishing constitutional and associa-
tional standing is unnecessary under the UCL,
organizations do not have to engage its mem-
bership in proving traceable and redressable
injuries.126 Fewer people involved in the litiga-
tion means faster, more efficient trials with
lower costs.
V. Drawbacks and Pitfalls
A. Remedies Are Limited
While the UCL's scope is broad, its reme-
dies are primarily limited to restitution,127
injunctive relief128 and civil penalties.129
Damages are not available under the UCL.130
Due to the nature of CWA violations, citi-
zens generally would not be seeking restitution
for UCL violations. Restitution restores to the
interested parties money or property unlawful-
ly taken through unfair competition.131 Most
citizen suits premised on CWA violations seek
to prevent or halt pollution, not to recover a
monetary loss. However, even if restitution is
an applicable remedy, relief may be limited
when citizens bring a representative action
under the UCL on behalf of absent parties. 
The California Supreme Court recently
determined disgorgement into a fluid recovery
fund is not permitted for representative
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115.  See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
116.  Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C.
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117.  Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 230 Cal. App. 3d 1125,
1156 (1991).
118.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997); see also supra
note 55.
119.  Mangini, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1156.
120.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200.
121.  Infra Section V.A. for discussion of how requests for
injunctive relief can undermine UCL claims based on wholly past
CWA violations.
122.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17205.
123.  See Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 54 Cal. App. 4th
499, 520 (1997).
124.  Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505(b), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b) (1994).
125.  McCall, supra note 52, at 849.
126. Id. at 839-40.
127.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17205 (West 1997).
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129.  Id. § 17206.  Only government entities may seek penal-
ties for UCL violations.
130.  Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal.
App. 3d 758, 774 (1989).
131.  Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 725
(Cal. 2000).
132.  Id.
actions have sought fluid recovery funds for a
number of years to force a defendant company
to disgorge all profit obtained through unfair
competition.133 While fluid recovery funds may
require a defendant to return money obtained
through ill-gotten means to injured parties, it
is also "used to . . . [force the] surrender of all
profits earned as a result of an unfair business
practice regardless of whether those profits
represent money taken directly from persons
who were victims of the unfair practice."134
Although the legislature authorized such
recovery in class action suits, it has given no
such statutory permission for representative
actions under the UCL.135 As already noted,
monetary relief under the UCL is limited to
restitution.136 Given this legislative directive,
the court refused to extend the remedy to UCL
representative actions and, as a result, the
extent of restitutionary relief under the UCL is
measured by the actual loss of the parties. 137
Injunctive relief is the most likely remedy
under the UCL for CWA violations. Since
"unfair business practices can take many
forms, the Legislature has given the courts the
power to fashion remedies to prevent their 'use
or employment' in whatever context they may
occur."138 Plaintiffs seeking remedial relief,
however, must provide the court with ample
reason to grant it. This depends greatly on the
facts of the case.
For example, in Hewlett, the trial court
ordered Squaw Valley to "restock, revegetate
and reforest" the land it unlawfully harvested in
the event the local government does not issue
a new use permit for the area.139 The court also
prohibited development in another area,
despite Squaw Valley's claims it had no inten-
tion of harvesting more timber.140 The appel-
late court upheld the prohibitory injunction,
finding that "the trial court was properly con-
cerned that Squaw Valley might once again
decide to develop these runs without obtain-
ing the necessary permits, severely harming an
environmentally sensitive area."141
However, injunctive relief poses problems
as well. Citizens seeking only injunctive relief
for wholly past acts need to be aware that
doing so presents a viable defense for defen-
dant companies that could undermine the
entire UCL claim.142 Although injunctive relief
under the UCL is available for past conduct,143
a court is unlikely to grant such relief if the
practice is not likely to recur.144 An injunction
under such circumstances would be meaning-
less.145 If an injunction was the only relief
sought in such a case, the absence of a mean-
ingful remedy, combined with the lack of a
recurring violation, would make the claim
moot and the court would dismiss the entire
action.146 Thus, while the UCL presents an
opportunity for addressing past CWA viola-
tions, it is only applicable where plaintiffs can
seek a viable remedy — and an injunction may
not be one of them if there is no likelihood of
future misconduct.
Civil penalties under the UCL are only
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133.  Id. A fluid recovery fund requires three steps:
First, the defendant's total damage liability is paid
over to a class fund. Second, individual class members
are afforded an opportunity to collect their individual
shares by proving their particular damages, usually
according to a lowered standard of proof. Third, any
residue remaining after individual claims have been
paid is distributed by one of several practical proce-
dures that have been developed by the courts.
Id. (quoting California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460,
472-73 (1986)).
134.  Id.
135.  Id. at 726.
136.  Id. at 732.
137.  Id.
138.  Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 54 Cal. App. 4th 499,
540 (1997) (quoting Consumers Union of United States, Inc., v.
Alta-Dena Certified Dairy, 4 Cal. App. 4th 963, 972 (1992)).
139.  Id. at 537-38.
140. Id.
141.  Id. at 542.
142.  STERN, supra note 50, at 164-65.
143.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17203 ("Any person who . . .
has engaged . . . in unfair competition may be enjoined in any
court of competent jurisdiction.").  This provision illustrates leg-
islative intent for the UCL to reach past conduct. Stop Youth
Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086 (Cal. 1998).
144.  See Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Hous. v. Westwood
Investors, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1377, 1393 (1990).
145.  Id.
146.  Id. (dismissing UCL action as moot where an injunc-
tion was sought for an alleged unlawful rental policy used four
years ago and there was no indication it would ever be used
again).
behalf of the people of California.147 Penalties
are limited to $2,500 per violation,148 signifi-
cantly less than the $25,000 per day available
under the CWA.149 In assessing civil penalties,
the court considers "the nature and serious-
ness of the misconduct, the number of viola-
tions, the persistence of the misconduct, the
length of time over which the misconduct
occurred, the willfulness of the defendant's
misconduct, and the defendant's assets, liabil-
ities, and net worth."150
The UCL does not provide for attorney fees,
but a plaintiff pursuing a private attorney gen-
eral suit may obtain litigation costs.151
California's Private Attorney General statute
provides for an award of litigation costs when:
(a) a significant benefit, whether pecu-
niary or nonpecuniary, has been con-
ferred on the general public or a large
class of persons, (b) the necessity and
financial burden of private enforce-
ment, or of enforcement by one public
entity against another public entity, are
such as to make the award appropriate,
and (c) such fees should not in the
interest of justice be paid out of the
recovery, if any.152
Because application of the doctrine varies
case-by-case, courts look to the facts of a mat-
ter when determining an award of attorney
fees.153
Engaging a government attorney in the lit-
igation to impose civil penalties on a UCL vio-
lator154 may preclude a plaintiff's chances of
obtaining attorney fees.155 Private enforcement
is required; the government cannot claim
attorney fees.  Again, how this rule is applied
depends on the facts of the case. In Hewlett, the
trial court awarded plaintiffs Hewlett and the
Sierra Club attorney fees totaling $672,000.156
The appellate court upheld the attorney fees,
despite imposing civil penalties.157 The trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it
awarded the attorney fees, although they were
"excessive," because the case "was beyond the
capabilities of the . . . District Attorney to pros-
ecute," making outside assistance essential.158
B. Defendants May Attempt to Remove 
to Federal Court
Many suits filed under the UCL premised
on the CWA may involve corporate defendants
residing in other states. Such parties may seek
to remove UCL suits to federal court based on
diversity and convenience. These efforts may
also be tactical if a plaintiff lacks standing —
an attempt to force the dismissal. 
Axiomatically, the UCL does not provide
standing for bringing suit in federal court.159
"[A] state legislature may not waive by statute
the prudential or constitutional limitations on
standing in federal court."160 For example, in
MAI Systems, the federal district court dis-
missed a counterclaim under the UCL based
on an allegedly misleading software licensing
agreement.161 Defendant was not a party to the
agreement; instead, it was bringing suit under
the UCL on behalf of the public.162 The court
found the defendant lacked standing to bring
the UCL claim in federal court for several rea-
sons. The defendant's UCL "private attorney
general" claim "violate[d] the prudential limi-
tation that parties must assert their own rights
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rights or interests of others."163 Also, the defen-
dant failed to allege actual personal harm
caused by the agreement.164 Finally, the court
could not award relief that would redress the
injury alleged — the defendant did not suffer a
cognizable injury and could not seek relief for
the harm suffered by the actual parties.165
The removal threat is basically an empty
one — if the plaintiff lacks constitutional
standing to bring an action in federal court, a
removal action necessarily fails.166 However, for
plaintiffs lacking constitutional standing to
bring suit in federal court, opposing removal
may still be strategically challenging and
expensive.  The party seeking removal has the
burden of showing that standing exists.167 If a
defendant company is arguing that an organi-
zation or individual person has the requisite
injury for standing, that organization is in the
precarious position of disputing the claims.
For example, an organization, which under nor-
mal circumstances would argue that it is repre-
sentative of the injuries of its members, must
contend that it lacks standing to bring suit in
federal court. 
Contesting removal can be long and costly.
Attorney fees are available,168 but only at the
discretion of the court.169 A court may award
attorney fees if it can be shown the party seek-
ing removal relied on frivolous arguments or
an improper basis.170 Again, this determination
turns on the facts of the case.171
C. UCL is Overused
Nearly every civil claim in California seems
to include a cause of action under the UCL.172
Consequently, the general perception of this
law is that it is overused and abused. This view
is so pervasive that California Supreme Court
Justice Brown recently referred to the UCL as "a
standardless, limitless, attorney fees
machine."173 It is no wonder that calls for
reform of the UCL abound.174
Not surprisingly, critics of the UCL often
attack the law's provisions that are most favor-
able to plaintiffs.  In Stop Youth Addiction v. Lucky
Stores, the California Supreme Court noted that
the UCL "has lax standing provisions, lacks res
judicata effect and carries the potential for mul-
tiple, repetitive suits."175 In particular, the
relaxed standing requirements give frivolous
litigants a field day, although at the same time,
provide citizens with legitimate claims a valu-
able passageway into the courtroom.  This con-
tradiction poses a strategic problem for citi-
zen-groups seeking valid claims. The more the
UCL is used, the more likely legislators and the
defense bar will seek reform of its more liberal
provisions. 
However, by using the UCL appropriately
and sparingly, citizen-groups may minimize the
scrutiny of so-called "reformers" and protect
the law's unique benefits.  Citizens should try
to use the UCL to bring claims consistent with
the statute’s purpose.  Environmental prob-
lems rooted in or coupled with economic con-
cerns are more legitimate foundations for UCL
suits than frivolous claims based on tenuous
injuries and vexatious motives.  The UCL
should be viewed as a helpful back-up for
standing deficiencies, not as carte blanche for
bringing claims unsupported by facts or reject-















165.  Id. at 542.
166.  Toxic Injuries Corp. v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 57 F. Supp.
2d 947, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
167.  Id.
168.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1997).
169.  Toxic Injuries Corp., 57 F. Supp. at 957.
170.  Id.
171.  Id. at 958 (finding removal was not "so obviously
barred" as to warrant an award of attorney fees to a public bene-
fit corporation contesting removal of a UCL private attorney gen-
eral suit); cf. As You Sow v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. C-93-3577-
VRW, 1993 WL 560086 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 1993) (awarding litiga-
tion costs to a nonprofit organization contesting removal of a
UCL claim because "defendants ha[d] shown no good ground for
the removal which would afford reason why fees and costs should
not be imposed").
172.  See generally Strickland & Moritz, supra note 153, at 698-99.
173.  Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950
P.2d 1086, 1115 (Cal. 1998) (Brown, J., dissenting).
174.  See generally id.; Strickland & Moritz, supra note 153, at
698-99; Robert C. Fellmeth, Unfair Competition Act Enforcement by
Agencies, Prosecutors, and Private Litigants:  Who's On First?, 15 CAL.
REG. L. REP. 1 (1995).
175.  Stop Youth Addiction, 950 P.2d at 1102.
Winter 2001 Who Needs Standing?
VI. Conclusion
Private attorney general suits under the
UCL serve an important role in citizen enforce-
ment of the CWA. The language and structure
of the CWA citizen suit provisions can hinder
lawsuits brought by the general public, espe-
cially for wholly past violations and for organi-
zations lacking standing. Under the UCL, citi-
zens find relief otherwise unavailable by other
laws and the federal courts.
Nevertheless, there are drawbacks to this
route. The remedies available to citizens under
the UCL are primarily limited to restitution and
injunctive relief. Civil penalties are available
only to government litigants. Furthermore,
attorney fees are not guaranteed for successful
private attorney general suits. There is also a
public relations concern about bringing suit
under the UCL. Due to its broad scope and lib-
eral standing requirements, suits under the
UCL are ubiquitous to the point of being vexa-
tious. There is a groundswell of backlash
against such suits, possibly leading to reform
of the UCL in the coming years.
Accordingly, plaintiffs seeking remedies
under the UCL for CWA violations should heed
some warnings. First, UCL suits are best used
when there are potential standing issues, when
there is a viable remedy sought for past viola-
tions or when limited funds prevent broader
participation in the suit. However, the UCL
cannot create a CWA violation where there is
none or provide a remedy where none is appli-
cable. Second, parties should consider, when-
ever possible, enlisting government parties in
the action to allow for civil penalties. However,
plaintiffs should do so cautiously as it may
jeopardize their chances to recover attorney
fees. Third, parties should remember that the
UCL is not a gold mine and will not provide
damages. It is best used when the relief sought
is restitution or injunction. Finally, plaintiffs
should use the UCL sparingly and appropriate-
ly. The statute provides a valuable passageway
to the courtroom that otherwise may not be
available. The relaxed standing provisions and
representative action measures can provide
help to standing-deficient and economically
strapped parties. However, overuse and abuse
of the UCL will only threaten its viability and
the future of citizen suits.  The UCL should not
be used as an excuse to bring suit where no
other law would even remotely sustain juris-
diction or a cause of action.
The UCL plays a valuable role in California
law by acknowledging that commercial activity
can negatively impact the public in ways that
substantive statutes and government authori-
ties cannot anticipate, prevent or remedy.
Furthermore, the UCL provides a conduit for
recasting unfair competition into legally recog-
nized consumer issues. In the case of the CWA,
the broad and nebulous nature of the UCL
gives the public the power to say protection of
clean water is not only an environmental con-
cern, but one of economic and consumer sig-
nificance as well. Thus, the UCL may not only
provide standing to citizen groups, but a new
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